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Abstract 
We model a network economy with three sectors: downstream firms, upstream firms, and banks. 
Agents are linked by productive and credit relationships so that the behavior of one agent influences 
the behavior of the others through network connections. Credit interlinkages among agents are a 
source of bankruptcy diffusion: in fact, failure of fulfilling debt commitments would lead to 
bankruptcy chains. All in all, the bankruptcy in one sector can diffuse to other sectors through linkages 
creating a vicious cycle and bankruptcy avalanches in the network economy. Our analysis show how 
the choices of credit supply by both banks and firms are interrelated. While the initial impact of 
monetary policy is on bank behaviour, we show the interactive play between the choices made by 
banks, the choices made by firms in their role as providers of credit, and the choices made by firms in 
their role as producers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We model a network economy with an inside credit (commercial credit) between firms of 
different productive sectors, and an outside credit (bank credit), which lends credit to 
industrial sectors (Stiglitz, Greenwald, 2003). Failure of fulfilling debt commitments could 
lead to bankruptcy chains. If debt commitments are not fulfilled, bad debt increases and the 
rate of interest may increase as well. The interest rate increase leads to more bankruptcies: 
“the high rate of bankruptcy is a consequence of the high interest rate as much as a 
consequence of it” (Stiglitz, Greenwald, 2003: 145). 
If future is uncertain, what probability is there that the contract will be fulfilled? Are there 
major consequences of a small shock? This paper will show in what way a business cycle is 
linked to firm bankruptcies and how a domino effect (a crescendo in terms of bankruptcy) can 
arise (and as such be avoided). At the same time, the main facts of firm demography (like 
power law distribution of size and Laplace growth rates of firms) emerge endogenously (and 
are more resistant to external shocks.) As opposed to previous models of business cycles, in 
our model, avalanches are due to the interdependence of the output of a firm on supply and 
payments from other firms. Similarly to the self-organized criticality inventory cycle 
proposed by Bak et al. (1993), in our model, small shocks fail to cancel at the aggregate level 
so that large economic fluctuations can occur even without aggregate shocks. According to 
Bak et al. (1993), we model productive relationships among agents as local interactions (with 
a different network topology). In addition, we consider firm-bank and firm-firm credit 
relationships that can amplify the effects of small idiosyncratic shocks on the aggregate. 
Heterogeneous agent interaction has a second major implication. We will see that the 
structure of aggregate behaviour (macro) actually emerges from the interaction among the 
agents (micro). In other words, statistical regularities emerge as a self-organised process at the 
aggregate level. Complex patterns of interacting individual behaviour may generate certain 
regularity at the aggregate level (Delli Gatti et al., 2005). The idea of representing a society 
by one exemplar (a representative agent) denies the fact that the organizational features of the 
economy play a crucial role in explaining what happens at the aggregate level (Kirman, 
1992). The model is presented in section 2. The model simulation and the discussion of 
results are shown in section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a sequential economy (t=1,2,…,T) populated by a multitude of heterogeneous agents 
belonging to three different sectors: a downstream sector with a number I of firms (labeled by 
the index i=1,2,…,I), an upstream sector with J firms (j = 1,2,…,J) and a banking sector with 
Z banks (z=1,2,…,Z). Downstream firms produce and sell final goods (at a stochastic price). 
The production of the final goods requires two productive inputs: labor and intermediate 
goods. The intermediate goods are produced “on demand” by upstream firms with a 
technology that requires only labor as input. Upstream firms sell intermediate goods to 
downstream firms by means of a commercial credit contract. Firms obtain credit from banks 
to finance the wage bill. Finally, banks are linked in the interbanking market in order to solve 
liquidity crises. 
The network structure of the economy is the following (see figure 1): each downstream firm i 
is linked to upstream firms j and j+1; the downstream firm i+1 is linked to upstream firms j+1 
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and j+2, and so on.1 Each firm is linked to a bank: the downstream firm i and the upstream 
firm j are linked to the bank z, and so on. Finally, each bank is linked to two neighboring 
banks: bank z is linked to banks z-1 and z+1. All in all, downstream firms, upstream firms and 
banks are linked by productive and credit relationships so that the behavior of one agent 
influences the behavior of the others through network connections.  
The production function of downstream firms is given by the equation: Yit=φAβit-1, where φ>1, 
0<β<1, and Ait is the net worth of the firm i at time t. The production of final goods needs two 
inputs. Hence, downstream firms have the following labor and intermediate goods 
requirement functions: Nit=δdYit, Qit=γYit, with δd>0 and γ>0. Final goods are sold at a 
stochastic price uit.2 Upstream firms produce intermediate goods required by the downstream 
sector by means of a technology employing only labor as input: Qjt= δuNjt, where δu>0 and, 
for assumption, Qjt=Qi-1t/2+Qit/2.  The output of the upstream sector is sold to downstream 
firms at a fixed price p. 
 
 
Figure 1. The network structure of the economy: 
Downstream firms (○), upstream firms (∆), and banks (□). 
 
 
Downstream firms sign a commercial credit contract with upstream firms so that they obtain 
the ordered quantity of the intermediate goods from upstream firms and pay back for it in the 
next period. Upstream firms charge an interest rate ru, constant along time and uniform across 
firms, on commercial loans. The wage bill is financed by bank loans with an interest rate ritbx 
(x=d for downstream, x=u for upstream firms).3 We assume that there is an infinite supply of 
labor at wage w. 
Downstream firms’ profit is equal to: piit=uitYit – (1+rbdit)wNit – (1+ru)pQjt, where rbdit is the 
interest rate on the bank loan. Upstream firms’ profit is equal to: pijt=p(1+ru)Qjt – 
(1+rbujt)wNjt, where rbujt is the interest rate on the bank loan. At the end of the period, firms’ 
net worth is equal to Axt=Axt-1+pixt, and a firm goes bankrupt if Axt<0 (x=i for downstream; x=j 
for upstream). We assume a very simplified mechanism of agents’ entry-exit: bankrupted 
                                                 
1 Accordingly, the downstream firm I is linked to upstream firms J and 1. 
2 That is a random variable that, for the sake of simplicity, is uniformly distributed in the interval (0,2). 
3 See below for the interest rate setting. 
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firms are replaced with new entrants on the basis of a one-to-one replacement. The same 
holds for banks.4 
The commercial credit relationship between downstream and upstream firms is a source of 
bankruptcy diffusion across the network. In fact, if a downstream firm goes bankrupt then it 
cannot refund the debt to the upstream ones increasing their probability of bankruptcy (due to 
the decrease of their net worth). The deterioration of the financial conditions of upstream 
firms jointly with the failure of downstream firms can cause bankruptcies even in the banking 
sector, given that bankrupted firms cannot refund loans to banks. All in all, bankruptcy in one 
sector can spread to other sectors through connections creating a vicious cycle and bankruptcy 
avalanches in the network economy, as we will illustrate in section 3. 
Banks lend funds to downstream and upstream firms in order to finance their production 
process, that is their wage bills. The total amount of credit each bank can supply to firms is 
equal to Lszt=Ezt/α, where Ezt is the level of bank z’s net worth at time t and α<1 is a 
prudential target set by a regulatory authority that banks have to respect. In other words, the 
level of credit supply is more than proportional to banks’ net worth and limited to a maximum 
depending on the coefficient α.  In each period banks collect the demand for credit from firms, 
Ldzt. Given that the supply of credit is limited to Lszt, firms can be rationed for an amount 
proportional to Lszt/Ldzt and revise their productive plans on the basis of the effective credit 
obtained from banks. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that deposits Dzt are a residual variable, given the 
balance sheet of banks. The interest rate paid by banks on deposits is rd, constant along time 
and uniform across banks. The interest rate on bank loans is: rbxyt=k/(Ayt/Ãxt)k, where 0<k<1, 
and Ãxt is the median of the firms’ net worth distribution at period t, computed separately for 
upstream and downstream firms (x=d and y=i for downstream firms, x=u and y=j for 
upstream firms). Accordingly, the higher the financial fragility of firms the higher the interest 
rate charged on bank loans. Banks’ profit is equal to: pibzt=rbditwNit + rbujtwNjt – rdDzt. The 
level of the banks’ net worth evolves according to the following equation: Ezt=Ezt-1 + pibzt – 
BDzt + IBzt, where BDzt is “bad debt” for bank z, due to the insolvencies produced by upstream 
and/or upstream firms’ failures, and IBzt is the result of liquidity adjustments on the interbank 
market. 
Banks can lend or borrow funds on the interbank market in order to solve liquidity crises or to 
invest resources in excess with respect to firms’ demand for credit. We assume that the rate of 
interest on the interbank market, rbb, is constant along time and uniform across banks. As said 
above, bank z interacts only with neighbors z-1 and z+1. Accordingly, in period t, each bank 
can be a fund lender or borrower with respect to the neighbor banks: 
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4 Accordingly, the total number of agents in the economy is constant along time. New agents are endowed with 
an initial amount of net worth equal to that choose for initial conditions (that is, the value of agents’ variables at 
time t=1). 
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where l and b indexes mean lending and borrowing, respectively. Let us explain the above 
four scenarios: (i) bank z lent funds in t–1 (and receives reimbursement with interest in t) and 
borrows funds in t; (ii) bank z lent funds in t–1 and lends funds in t; (iii) bank z borrowed 
funds in t–1 (and refunds the loan with interest in t) and borrows funds in t; (iv) bank z  
borrowed funds in t–1 and lends funds in t. Even though banks operate in the interbank 
market to manage their liquidity and, in particular, to avoid defaults due to firms’ bad debts, 
the interbanking activity can be an additional source of spread of bankruptcies (Iori et al., 
2004). In fact, a borrowing bank may go bankrupt in a given period generating insolvency for 
the lending bank. The financial conditions of this last bank can degenerate, resulting in 
another failure. So, as in the case of firm-firm and firm-bank credit relationships, interbank 
connections can generate avalanches of defaults, reinforcing the vicious circle of spreading of 
bankruptcies across the network economy. 
 
 
3. Simulations 
 
We simulate the network economy described above with I=J=Z=250 agents in each sector 
and analyze the model simulation from period t=1 to T=1000. At the beginning of the 
simulation, agents (firms and banks) start with an amount of net worth equal to 100. The wage 
is fixed at level w = 1. The same holds for the intermediate goods price, p = 1; the interest rate 
on commercial credit, ru = 0.05; the interest rate on deposits, rd=0.01; the interest rate on 
interbank loans, rbb = 0.01.5 
Figure 2 describes the fluctuating behavior of the average production of downstream firms. 
Nevertheless, agents start with the same initial condition. Simulations show that a significant 
heterogeneity emerges in agent variables. For example, the final distribution (at period 
T=1000) of the net worth of downstream firms is highly asymmetric and skewed to the right 
(Axtell, 2001). The same result holds for upstream firms and banks. In addition, figure 3 
shows the difference between the firm size distribution that emerges from simulations and a 
normal one.6 The model also generates a tent-shaped (Laplace) distribution of firm growth 
rates (Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi, Secchi, 2003), as shown in Figure 4. 
 
                                                 
5 The parameter setting of the simulation is the following: φ=2.5, β=0.9 (production function parameters: 
downstream firms); γ=0.5 (intermediate goods requirement function coefficient: downstream firms); δd=0.5 (labor 
requirement function coefficient: downstream firms); δu=1 (labor requirement function coefficient: upstream 
firms); k=0.1 (firm-bank interest rate function parameter); α=0.85 (prudential target for credit supply: banks) 
6 The Bera-Jarque test refuses the null hypothesis of normality of the agent size distribution at 1% significance 
level. 
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Figure 2. Downstream sector average production 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Downstream firm size distribution (net worth) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Laplace (double exponential) distribution of firm growth rates.7 
 
                                                 
7 Pooled data from the last 100 simulation periods. 
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Figure 5. Cross correlation of bankruptcies in different sectors  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Avalanches size distribution 
 
 
A central feature of the network economy described in our model is related to the spread of 
bankruptcies through the productive and credit linkages among agents. If a downstream firm 
goes bankrupt it cannot refund the debt to the upstream firms it is linked to, decreasing their 
net worth, and increasing their probability of bankruptcy. The weakening of the financial 
conditions of upstream firms jointly with the failure of downstream firms can cause 
bankruptcies even in the banking sector, given that bankrupted firms cannot refund loans to 
banks. All in all, bankruptcy in one sector can spread to other sectors through network 
connections creating a vicious cycle and bankruptcy avalanches in the economy. Figure 5 
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shows that the number of bankruptcies per period in a sector is correlated to the number of 
bankruptcies in other sectors. In addition, figure 6 shows that the distribution of the total 
number of bankruptcies per period has a fatter tail with respect to a normal distribution,8 so 
that “rare events” are more probable in this setting than in an economy characterized by 
normal distributions. 
 
 
4. Conclusive remarks 
 
The idea of a snowball phenomenon in which the bankruptcy of one firm somehow affects the 
financial conditions of the other firms forcing the most vulnerable among them into 
bankruptcy is not new in economic literature. In this paper the idea is framed in the context of 
a network of economy in which firms are linked by production and commercial relationship.  
The bankruptcy of a firm makes banks less willing to extend loans to other firms. A reduction 
of credit to a firm or an increase in the interest rate charged affects the willingness and ability 
of that firm to supply commercial credit to its customers. As its customers are adversely 
affected, they transmit the contraction of credit on to their customers, and so forth around the 
economy. The higher interest rates charged by suppliers imply higher bankruptcy probabilities 
for these firms and this in turn induces banks to cut back on their credit.  
Our analysis has shown how the decision to provide credit by both banks and firms are 
interrelated. While the initial impact of monetary policy is on bank behaviour, we showed the 
interactive play between the choices made by banks, the choices made by firms in their role as 
providers of credit, and the choices made by firms in their role as producers. 
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